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ABSTRACT 
Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) is an essential protocol in 
IPv6 suite, but it is known to be vulnerable to critical attacks. 
Thus, SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) is proposed to counter 
NDP security threats. Unfortunately, operating systems lack the 
sophisticated implementations for SEND. There is limited success 
with SEND implementation for Linux and BSD, and no 
implementation for Windows families. Therefore, the majority of 
the users are not secured with SEND. In this paper, we will 
introduce an implementation of SEND for Windows families 
(WinSEND). WinSEND is a user-space application which 
provides the protection for NDP in Windows. It has direct access 
to Network Interface Card (NIC) and efficiently handles NDP 
messages by using Winpcap. WinSEND works as a service with 
easy user interface to set the security parameters for selected NIC. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network 
Protocols; D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection; 
D.4.9 [Operating Systems]: Systems Programs and Utilities 
General Terms 
Security, Experimentation 
Keywords 
SEND implementation, Cryptographically Generated Addresses 
(CGA), IPv6 security and protection, Neighbor Discovery 
Protocol (NDP) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Neighbor Discovery Protocol (RFC 4861 and RFC 4862) does not 
have a built-in security mechanism to enable nodes to authenticate 
each other. Therefore, NDP is prone to critical attacks [1]. NDP 
assumes that all nodes on the link trust each other, but this 
assumption cannot be guaranteed. Consequently, a malicious user 
can impersonate legitimate nodes by forging NDP messages to 
generate intentional serious attacks. Therefore, Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) working group, IETF SEND, 
proposes the Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [2] as an 
extension to NDP. SEND uses RSA key pairs, Cryptographically 
Generated Addresses CGA [3], digital signature and X.509 
certification to offer significant protection to NDP. 
Unfortunately, there is no major operating system (OS) providing 
an effective level of support for SEND. The current SEND 
implementations for specific OS distributions such as Linux and 
FreeBSD are basically experimental codes rather than production 
ready software. SEND is not supported yet in Windows 
XP/Vista/7 [4]. This means that the majority of hosts are not 
secured by SEND, since the Windows family is the most popular 
operating system and accounts for more than 80% of usage 
compared to other operating systems [5]. This lack of SEND 
support leaves IPv6 local networks vulnerable to attacks and 
consequently limits IPv6 deployment.   
Thus, we decided to implement SEND from scratch and offer it as 
a service for Windows families. Our implementation (WinSEND) 
is a user-space implementation which is developed in Microsoft 
.NET. WinSEND works as service for Windows families with 
easy user interface to set security parameters for the proper 
Network Interface Card (NIC). To the best of our knowledge, 
WinSEND is the first SEND implementation for Windows 
families. This paper describes the design and the implementation 
of WinSEND. 
The paper is structured as follow. An overview of NDP and 
possible attacks against it is presented in Section 2. Section 3 
shows how SEND can protect NDP. In Section 4, we list the 
existing SEND implementations. Section 5 discusses the design 
choice of WinSEND implementation. Section 6 shows the 
WinSEND implementation. The last section concludes the work.  
2. NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY PROTOCOL 
2.1 NDP Messages and Functionalities 
Neighbor Discovery (ND) for IPv6 [6], and IPv6 StateLess 
Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) [7], together are referred to 
as IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP). NDP is one of the 
main protocols in IPv6 suite. NDP greatly improves the efficiency 
and the network management. It is also heavily used for several 
critical functionalities, such as discovering other existing nodes 
on the same link, determining others’ link layer addresses, 
detecting duplicate addresses, finding routers and maintaining 
reachability information about paths to active neighbor. Also, 
NDP plays a crucial role in mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) networks [8]. 
NDP functionalities are based on five ICMPv6 messages: Router 
solicitation (RS), Router Advertisement (RA), Neighbor 
Solicitation (NS), Neighbor Advertisement (NA), and Redirect. 
RS is sent by hosts to request for RA. Routers advertise the link 
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local prefixes and other options by RA. RA is sent periodically or 
as a response to RS. NS is sent by IPv6 hosts to find neighbors on 
the link or to verify the reachability of nodes. NA is sent by IPv6 
host as a response to NS or to propagate the link layer address. 
Redirect is sent by routers to inform hosts about the preferred 
first-hop destination.  
2.2 NDP Security and Privacy Implications 
NDP offers only selected basic protective mechanisms to ensure 
that packets come from nodes that directly connect to a local link. 
However, this protection shield is not enough to protect IPv6 
local networks. If NDP is not secure, it is vulnerable to a set of 
attacks. IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and threats 
[1], describes these attacks. The attacker can carry out several 
attacks based on address resolution, redirect, Duplicate Address 
Detection (DAD), Router Advertisement (RA), and address 
configuration. Besides, the SLAAC leads to privacy problems. 
Since generating the interface identifier from the MAC address, 
(which remains constant over time), this makes it possible to track 
a node over the Internet. Also, SLAAC make it easy to correlate 
the traffic patterns and the activities to the certain user [9].  
3. SECURE NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY 
SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [2] offers three additional 
features to NDP:  Address ownership proof, message protection 
and router authorization mechanism. To achieve these 
enhancements, SEND comes with four new options: CGA, RSA 
Signature, Timestamp, and Nonce. 
 CGA Option: carries the associated parameters to enable the 
receiver to validate the proper binding between the public key 
(used to verify the signature) and the Cryptographically 
Generated Address (CGA). Also, CGA depends on a security 
parameter (Sec) which is chosen by the user to determine the 
desired security level against brute force attack. Sec value is not 
carried by CGA option. It is encoded in the IP address bits. 
 RSA Signature Option: this option authenticates the identity of 
the sender. The sender sign messages with the private key which 
is related to the public key has been used in CGA’s generation 
algorithm. This signature prevents an attacker from spoofing 
CGA addresses. 
 Nonce Options: is used to protect messages from replay attacks, 
and to ensure that an advertisement is a fresh response to a 
solicitation sent earlier by the node. 
 Timestamp Option: is used to ensure replay protection against 
unsolicited advertisements, such as periodic RA and Redirect 
messages. 
SEND uses an Authorization Delegation Discovery (ADD) 
process to validate and authorize IPv6 routers to act as default 
gateways, and specifies the IPv6 prefixes that a router is 
authorized to announce on the link. ADD relies on an electronic 
certificate issued by a trusted third party. Before any node can 
accept a router as its default router, the node must be configured 
with a trust anchor(s) that can certify the router via certificate 
paths. So, the node requests the “router” to provide its X.509 
certificate path to a Trust Anchor (TA) which is preconfigured on 
the node. The “router” should not be trusted if it fails to provide 
the path to TA.  
Two new ICMPv6 discovery messages are offered for identifying 
the router authorization process: the Certificate Path Solicitation 
(CPS), and the Certificate Path Advertisement (CPA). A CPS 
message is sent by hosts during the ADD process to request a 
certification path between a router and one of the host’s trust 
anchors. The CPA message is sent in reply to the CPS message 
and contains the router certificate.  
4. SEND IMPLEMENTATIONS 
There are some experimental implementations for SEND which 
are done for Linux and *BSD. Some of these implementations are 
done in user-space and others are done at the kernel. NTT 
DoCoMo USA Labs [10] implemented the first open source user-
space implementation of SEND. Their implementation (send-0.2) 
works on FreeBSD. However, DoCoMo USA Labs is no longer 
maintaining SEND project and source code is no longer available 
for downloading in the web site and the support has been 
canceled. NDprotector [11] is another user-space implementation 
of CGA and SEND for Linux based on Scapy6 and it is limited to 
Linux platform due to its dependency on iproute2, ip6table, and 
netfilter queue. Easy-SEND [12] is a further Linux user-space 
implementation of SEND developed in Java. Easy-SEND is an 
open source projects which is developed for educational purpose.  
Other implementations try to integrate the SEND with the NDP 
code at the kernel. In Native SeND kernel API for *BSD (send-
0.3) implementation [13], a new kernel module (send.ko) is 
implemented to act as a gateway between the network stack and 
the user-space interface. Huawei and BUPT (Beijing University of 
Post and Telecommunications) introduced an implementation for 
SEND [14] within the Linux kernel IPv6 module. This work is a 
research prototype under development, which still lacks the 
interoperability testing. Bugs that could even cause the kernel to 
crash are expected.  
From our literature review, we did not find any SEND 
implementation for Windows families. Therefore, we decided to 
implement SEND for Windows. More details about the design 
and architecture of this implementation (WinSEND) appear in the 
following sections. 
5. WinSEND DESIGN 
5.1 WinSEND architecture 
For WinSEND implementation, Winsock or Winpcap can be used 
to transfer data between Network Interface Card (NIC) to the 
upper layers and vice versa. Winsock API is implemented in 
Windows to allow the access to network services, especially 
TCP/IP. It is designed and implemented based on BSD sockets 
with some new functionality that enables API to support windows 
standard programming models. Winpcap project started about 10 
years ago as a need to run network as an analyzing and tcpdump 
tool on Windows machines, which later became known as libpcap 
and tcpdump ported on Microsoft OS [15]. 
WinSEND uses Winpcap library which has direct access to the 
raw sockets. Winpcap offers the possibility for an application to 
receive/send network traffic before processing it by the OS. Thus, 
by using Winpcap, the network traffic can bypasses the OS and 
give an application the direct access to link layer. Moreover, 
Winpcap has the following advantages over Winsock API: 
 SIO_RCVALL [16] control code (in Winsock), enables a socket 
to receive all raw packets. However, WinSEND is just 
interested in ICMPv6 messages that are related to NDP 
messages and left the normal TCP/IP stack to handle the other 
traffic. Thus, all other traffics that are not related to NDP should 
be filtered out. In Winsock, this filtering is done in user-space 
and it takes a large amount of CPU power, and the kernel buffer 
will be out of space and force to drop packets [17]. So one 
solution is to bypass Winsock and enable the application to 
interact to either the Transport Data Interface (TDI) layer or to 
Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) [18]. 
 Overall performance of Winpcap in capturing and transmitting 
data is better than Winsock. Winpcap is located below tcp.sys in 
NDIS that can bypass windows protocol stack. To speed up data 
processing in Winsock, some of network services, such as 
firewall and network list services can be disabled. However, the 
memory usage and response time is still higher than Winpcap. 
Also, some of critical windows updates that are based on those 
services will fail. [19] 
Figure 1 shows the Architecture of WinSEND and the involving 
libraries in sending and receiving traffic. Winpcap is a main 
external API in WinSEND application. It is subdivided into three 
components: a packet capture device driver, a low level dynamic 
library which is called Netgroup Packet Filter (NPF), and a high 
level static library. When traffic arrives to a network adapter, the 
network adapter invokes the “Network Trap” which copies packet 
to NPF. Then, NPF applies user defined filter, i.e. icmpv6, and 
sends the captured packets to user-space. Wpcap.dll compiles user 
defined filters. Also, Wpcap.dll contains some user mode 
functions that enable user application to receive and send packets. 
To limit the packets lost’, due to processing time by application, 
NPF buffers the incoming packets. Packet.dll provides common 
interfaces to packet capture device driver among different versions 
of “win32”. Therefore, the user code can run independently of 
“win32” API version.  
5.2 WinSEND Components 
WinSEND is subdivided into three main components: WinSEND 
user interface, WinSEND service and WinSEND main classes. 
Figure 2 shows these components.  
 WinSEND User Interface offers the possibility for the user to 
generate CGA address and save SEND parameters which is 
required for WinSEND service. The user can set the desired 
security parameter “Sec” and determine which interface will be 
secured by WinSEND. 
  WinSEND Service is the main part of this application. It does 
the functionalities of SEND in Windows. For instance, it 
implements CGA generation and verification and signature 
generation and verification. It also offers the other SEND 
options. 
 WinSEND Main Classes (class library), contain shared classes 
that are called by both WinSEND user interface and WinSEND 
Service.  
WinSEND parameters are stored in XML file format. This XML 
file contains SEND options such as the “subnet prefix”, “Sec” 
value and key pairs (public/private keys). The reason for storing 
CGA parameters is to avoid CGA generation delays and to skip 
the CGA generation process while a node is connected to the 
same network. However, the address is not valid forever. It 
changes once the node joins a new subnet. For generating new 
CGA addresses, WinSEND reruns all CGA generation processes 
automatically. When the WinSEND service runs on a node for the 
first time, it calls “KeyGeneration”, a function that generates 
key pairs in user-defined key size automatically. By default, the 
WinSEND uses RSA public key with 1024-bit length. 
6. WinSEND IMPLEMENTATION AND 
TESTING 
WinSEND integrates the security options to NDP messages. It 
generates CGA address for the node and verifies the received 
CGA addresses. For generating CGA, a security level “Sec” value 
should be specified through the WinSEND user interface. "Sec” 
value determines how it is difficult to break CGA by the brute-
force attack.  “Sec” value also affects the CGA generation time. A 
higher “Sec” value means longer time to generate CGA. 
WinSEND implementation is tested in several experiments. One 
of these experiments is described below. The experiment is done 
in a test-bed which contains one router and two clients: A and B. 
Both A and B run WinSEND application. As soon as B is 
connected to the network, WinSEND service generates a CGA 
local link address and assigns it for the network adapter. Then it 
creates a Router Solicitation (RS) packet and sends it on the link. 
Once it receives the Router Advertisement (RA) message from the 
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Figure 1. WinSEND architecture for sending and receiving 
packets via Winpcap library 
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Figure 2. WinSEND main components and its relationships 
router, WinSEND extract RA message to retrieve the needed data, 
such as “subnet prefix” to generate CGA global address and 
secure the response message with WinSEND. 
Once the node generates its IPv6 address in a secure way by 
WinSEND, SEND options are attached to all Neighbor Discovery 
Protocol (NDP) messages. Figure 3 shows Wireshark screenshot of 
Neighbor Solicitation (NS) packet. All SEND options: CGA, 
timestamp, Nonce, and RSA signature are attached to the sent packet.   
The receiver node should verify the CGA and the signature for the 
incoming packets. When client “A” receives NS message from client 
B, it verifies CGA. If the verification process successes, it accepts the 
traffic from “B”. In addition to CGA verification, the receiver node 
needs to verify the signature which is carried by RSA Signature 
Option. If the signature verification fails, the node discards the packet 
silently and considers that it comes from a malicious node. In case the 
network has non-CGA nodes, the WinSEND can be configured to 
discard all packets sent by non-CGA nodes silently to avoid any 
possibility to generate Denial of service (DoS) attacks. Therefore, it is 
recommended to force all nodes to use CGA, otherwise it is not easy to 
distinguish between real and fake addresses. 
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) is one of the most novel 
features in IPv6. In non-trusted environments, NDP is vulnerable to 
several attacks. The Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) protocol 
was proposed to counter most of the threats against NDP. However, 
SEND is not widely implemented. There are some SEND 
implementations in Linux and BSD, but no implantation for 
Windows. We implement WinSEND for Windows family, the most 
popular operating systems. WinSEND is developed in Microsoft 
.NET. It can be installed and integrated to Windows as a service to 
provide the functionalities of SEND. It has an easy user interface to 
enable the user to set the desired security parameters. WinSEND 
uses Winpcap API to have a direct access to raw sockets and bypass 
normal TCP/IP stack. To avoid the delay due to CGA generation 
algorithm, WinSEND stores CGA parameters in an XML file. These 
parameters are update when the node joins to a new subnet. 
In this paper we put the basic principles for designing the 
implementation of SEND for Windows operating systems. As future 
work, we will continue the work to optimize the code. Currently, 
WinSEND is implemented to do the brute-force search to satisfy 
Hash2 condition [3] in CGA algorithm sequentially. In sequential 
computation, one instruction is executed per unit of time and 
WinSEND application uses only one CPU core of the computing 
device. If computing device has more than one core, the WinSEND 
is not able to use all the CPU capacity. However, the CGA is 
computationally heavy and it can take long time especially for high 
“Sec” value. In some cases, it is better to invest all the CPU capacity 
to finish the CGA computation as fast as possible. Consequently, we 
are working to offer WinSEND with parallel computational mode.     
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Figure 3. Wireshark screenshot of NS packet 
 
